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EYES TIED SHUT:  LITIGATING FOR ACCESS UNDER CIPA
IN THE GOVERNMENT’S “WAR ON TERROR”
CAMERON STRACHER*
INTRODUCTION
The government’s “War on Terror” has largely been a secret
war.1  This is true not only on the so-called battlefield, but in the
courtroom as well.  Numerous proceedings against alleged ter-
rorists and those alleged to have violated anti-terrorism laws have
been conducted either in partial or complete secrecy.2  In these
cases, the government often invokes provisions of federal regula-
tions and statutes – such as the Special Administrative Measures3
and the Classified Information Procedure Act (CIPA)4 – that re-
strict the type and quantity of information available to the public
during the pre-trial and trial proceedings of those charged with acts
of terror against the United States.  While the First Amendment re-
quires that all criminal trials be open to the press and public absent
compelling and clearly articulated reasons requiring closure,5 the
government’s attempt to restrict access to these proceedings threat-
* J.D. Harvard Law School, 1987.  Publisher, New York Law School Law Review
and partner at Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP. The author would like to thank the
following persons for their assistance with writing and editing this article: Professors
Donald H. Zeigler, Tanina Rostain, and Sadiq Reza, Associate Dean Stephen Ellmann,
Orin Kurtz, and Arminda Bepko. Assistant United States Attorneys Brian Miller and
Robert Spencer also engaged me on some of these issues and provided me with helpful
information, although I’m certain they would disagree with my conclusions.
1. See, e.g., David Rogers, CIA Commits to Huge Covert Investment, WALL ST. J., Oct.
5, 2001, at A3 (reporting that between $700 million and $800 million has been secretly
allocated to the CIA for anti-terrorism efforts).
2. See, e.g., North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002) (holding that newspapers did not have a First Amendment right of access to
deportation proceedings that Attorney General determined presented significant na-
tional security concerns), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct 2215 (2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296
F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (reversing district court order granting alleged “enemy com-
batant” access to counsel because of court’s failure to give proper weight to national
security concerns), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
3. 28 C.F.R. § 501 (2003).
4. 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 1-16 (2003).
5. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 & n.17 (1980)
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174 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
ens the carefully articulated justifications underlying this right.6  As
the Supreme Court concluded in Globe Newspaper Co., in overturn-
ing an order closing a trial involving a sexual offense alleged to
have been committed against a minor victim:
[T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly
significant role in the functioning of the judicial process
and the government as a whole.  Public scrutiny of a crim-
inal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity
of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defen-
dant and to society as a whole. . . . And in the broadest
terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public
to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial
process — an essential component in our structure of
self-government.7
In light of the extraordinary nature of the events of September
11 and its aftermath, and the extraordinary interest both in the
United States and throughout the world in the response of our gov-
ernment to those events, the right of the public to observe and to
scrutinize the workings of our judicial system should not be sacri-
ficed to amorphous “national security” concerns.
This article recounts the experience of the attorneys represent-
ing approximately a dozen media clients seeking access to docu-
ments, pleadings, and the courtroom in the federal criminal case
against Zaccarias Moussaoui.8  In the Moussaoui case, the govern-
ment sought – and continues to seek – to conduct the proceedings
als); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (right to
attend testimony at criminal trial of minor victim of sexual offense).
6. “Openness . . . enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.”  Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).  Closed proceedings, in contrast, in-
hibit the “crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice” and lead to dis-
trust of the judicial system if, for example, the outcome is unexpected and the reasons
for it are hidden from public view. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571.
7. 457 U.S. at 606 (footnote omitted).
8. Along with Lee Levine, Jay Brown, and Thomas Curley, I represented ABC,
Inc., Associated Press, Cable News Network LP, LLLP, CBS Broadcasting Inc., The
Hearst Corporation, National Broadcasting Company, Inc., The New York Times Com-
pany, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Star Tribune Company,
Tribune Company, and The Washington Post in the Fourth Circuit, and many of those
same companies in related proceedings in the district court in United States v. Mous-
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2003] EYES TIED SHUT 175
in unprecedented secrecy, with very limited access by the public or
press.  The attempt to gain access to the matters I write about here
was often frustrating, sometimes Kafkaesque.  Given no notice that
particular proceedings were taking place, and with little informa-
tion as to what facts or legal arguments documents contained, it was
extremely difficult to craft arguments to counter the government’s
“national security” mantra.  Fortunately, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized the threat to
American constitutional values, and has allowed significant access
to papers and proceedings in the case.  Because the case is ongoing
at the time of this writing, however, it is not clear whether it will
represent a victory for the media and the First Amendment, or a
triumph in the government’s secret war.
This article describes two disputes between the media and the
government over access.  Part I describes the dispute over access to
Moussaoui’s pro se filings.  Although the district court initially
granted the government’s motion to seal all papers filed by Mous-
saoui, the court reversed ground when the media argued that the
court had failed to comply with all the procedures required under
the First Amendment and relevant Fourth Circuit precedent before
documents may be sealed.  It took a second access motion, how-
ever, for the government to concede that many of the pro se filings
should be unsealed.  Part II describes the media’s efforts to unseal
briefs and to open the courtroom in the government’s appeal of
the district court’s order directing the government to produce a
witness – widely reported to be Ramzi bin al-Shibh – for a deposi-
tion pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.  The Fourth Circuit initially granted the United States’
motion to seal the substantive record on appeal, to close oral argu-
ment to the public, and to seal the government’s certificate of con-
fidentiality and motion to seal oral argument.9  In both their
this article are my own, however, and do not necessarily reflect those of the other law-
yers involved in the case or any of the clients.
9. By its express terms, the March 21 Order at issue “grant[ed] the certificate of
confidentiality,” “seal[ed] the joint appendix,” and closed the courtroom to the public
for oral argument.  Pursuant to this Order, most other substantive portions of the re-
cord likewise were filed under seal.  At the time the media first moved to intervene, the
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procedural genesis and effective scope, the Fourth Circuit’s orders,
which were entered without notice or opportunity for the public to
be heard, were virtually unprecedented.10
As in the district court, the arguments the media made in their
motion seeking access to the sealed documents on appeal and to
attend the oral argument convinced the Fourth Circuit to reverse
ground.  The court rejected the government’s argument that CIPA
gave federal prosecutors broad, unfettered discretion to impose se-
crecy on national security grounds.  Ultimately, the court held that
it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the order directing
Ramzi bin al-Shibh to be deposed because the order was non-final.
The government made a motion for rehearing en banc, which was
denied in a seven to five vote.  Part II concludes with a critique of
the arguments of the dissenting judges that the Classified Informa-
tion Procedures Act provided a valid basis for appellate
jurisdiction.11
I. THE BATTLE FOR ACCESS TO MOUSSAOUI’S PRO SE FILINGS
In May, 2002, approximately six months after he had been in-
dicted, Zaccarias Moussaoui dismissed his court appointed attor-
neys and chose to proceed pro se.12  Although the district court
appointed Frank Dunham, of the Eastern District of Virginia Public
Defender’s office, as his “stand-by” counsel, Moussaoui took the
lead in his own defense.  Soon thereafter, he began to file a series
merits (as well as the government’s separately filed “Table of Authorities”), various ap-
pendices, the government’s certificate of confidentiality and motion to seal argument,
and even the government’s motion to seal the latter.  Doc. No. 3754127-1 at 1 in United
States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (March 21, 2003) (Order); Doc. No. 3755646-1 at 1 in
Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (March 24, 2003) (Order).  All the pleadings in the Moussaoui
case are available on line at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/Dock
etSheet.html, last visited November 21, 2003. [Hereinafter indicated by “Doc. No.”].
10. Indeed, as the media argued, even the Pentagon Papers case and the hydrogen
bomb plans case were litigated in public. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wisc. 1979).
See also discussion infra note 62.
11. The article does not consider the other bases for appellate jurisdiction ad-
vanced by the government, most notably the “collateral order” doctrine.
12. Subsequently, by order dated November 14, 2003, the district court vacated its
prior order permitting Moussaoui to proceed pro se, and ordered that standby counsel
be appointed counsel of record. Doc. No. 1120 in United States v. Moussaoui, 01-CR-
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of rambling and sometimes offensive legal pleadings.13  In a letter
to the court dated August 22, 2002, originally filed under seal, the
government contended that “defendant is writing pleadings for the
purpose of either (1) sending messages to conspirators or sympa-
thizers, or (2) making public political statements” and the govern-
ment requested that defendant’s future filings be “presumptively
sealed” unless the government and/or the court agreed other-
wise.14  As authority for its request, the government invoked the
Special Administrative Measures imposed on Moussaoui’s pre-trial
confinement that sharply limited his communication with the
outside world.15  By permitting defendant to file his pleadings pub-
licly, the government argued, “the purpose of the SAM is gutted.”16
On August 29, 2002, without public notice and in a proceeding
closed to the public, the district court addressed the government’s
August 22nd letter.  Indicating that it was treating the letter as a
motion to seal the pleadings, the court advised the defendant that
all of his pleadings would be kept sealed “unless [he] tone[s] down
the rhetoric,” and “confine[s] them to proper, lawyer-like rheto-
ric.”17  In an order dated the same day memorializing its bench rul-
ing, the district court explained that Moussaoui’s pro se pleadings
“continue to contain extensive inappropriate rhetoric” and are “re-
plete with irrelevant, inflammatory and insulting rhetoric.”18  The
court further found that the record “supports the United States’
concern that the defendant . . . is attempting to use the court as a
vehicle through which to communicate with the outside world in
violation of the Special Administrative Measures governing the con-
ditions of his confinement.”19  Consequently, the court granted the
13. Defendant’s pleadings included his 8/1/02 motion “for a 1st Class Ticket on
747-400 Out of the United States Now” and his 8/12/02 motion “to Keep Mad, Out of
Control Standby Hord of Blood Sucker, Out of Halal, Pure Pro Se Land.”  Doc. No.’s
383, 407 in United States v. Moussaoui, 01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002).
14. Doc. No. 464 at 1 & 3 in Moussaoui, 01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002) (August 22,
2002 letter from R. Spencer to Hon. L. Brinkema).
15. Id. at 1; see 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2003).
16. Doc. No. 464 at 1 in Moussaoui, 01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002) (August 22, 2002
letter from R. Spencer, Esq. to Hon. L. Brinkema).
17. Doc. No. 466 in Moussaoui, 01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002) (August 29, 2002 Tr.
34:15-17, 35:1-3).
18. Doc. No. 465 at 2-3 in Moussaoui, 01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002) (August 29, 2002
Order).
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government’s motion to seal Moussaoui’s pleadings and ordered,
inter alia, “that any future pleadings filed by the defendant, pro se,
containing threats, racial slurs, calls to action, or other irrelevant
and inappropriate language” be filed and kept under seal.20  The
practical effect of the August 29th order was to presumptively seal
everything Moussaoui filed in the district court.
On behalf of the media, we filed a motion in the district court
challenging the August 29 order and seeking access to the plead-
ings and documents that had been filed pro se by Moussaoui and
placed under seal by the court.21  We argued that the district
court’s order, entered without public notice or comment, and with-
out consideration of the strong First Amendment and common law
arguments against complete sealing, was seriously flawed.  Fourth
Circuit case law requires a district court to follow specific procedu-
ral requirements before it seals a record or closes a courtroom.  De-
spite its conservative reputation, the Fourth Circuit tilts heavily in
favor of the press and public in access matters.  For example, in In
re Time Inc.22, the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court order de-
nying a motion by various news organizations to unseal exhibits that
Julie Hiatt Steele had filed under seal in several pre-trial motions in
her defense against charges of obstruction of justice filed by the
Office of Independent Counsel in connection with its investigation
of President Clinton.  The court held that “[a] First Amendment
right of access applies to a criminal trial, including documents sub-
mitted in the course of a trial.”23  The Fourth Circuit emphasized
that this right imposes certain obligations on a trial court:
[A] court must assess whether sealing documents is “ ‘ne-
cessitated by a compelling government interest, and . . .
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’”  In making this
20. Id. at 4.
21. We had been involved in the Moussaoui case since we were retained by Court
TV to assist in its ultimately unsuccessful efforts to televise the pre-trial and trial pro-
ceedings.  Cameras are prohibited in federal criminal trials by both Rule 53 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure and Local Rule 83.3 of the Eastern District of Virginia.
Court TV argued that this per se ban was unconstitutional.  The district court, however,
denied Court TV’s motion, finding it had no discretion to disregard the prohibition
against photographing federal court proceedings, and that the ban was not unconstitu-
tional.  United States v. Moussaoui, 205 F.R.D. 183, 184 (E.D. Va. 2002).
22. 182 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 1999).
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assessment, a district court . . . must (1) provide public
notice that the sealing of documents may be ordered, (2)
provide interested persons an opportunity to object
before sealing is ordered, (3) state the reasons, supported
with specific findings, for its decision if it decides to seal
documents, and (4) state why it rejected alternatives to
sealing.24
Moreover, in In re Washington Post, the court expressly rejected
the government’s argument that the procedural requirements for
sealing should not apply when the government asserts that national
security interests are at stake:
[T]roubled as we are by the risk that disclosure of classi-
fied information could endanger the lives of both Ameri-
cans and their foreign informants, we are equally
troubled by the notion that the judiciary should abdicate
its decisionmaking responsibility to the executive branch
whenever national security concerns are present.  History
teaches us how easily the spectre of a threat to “national
security” may be used to justify a wide variety of repressive
government actions.  A blind acceptance by the courts of
the government’s insistence on the need for secrecy, with-
out notice to others, without argument, and without a
statement of reasons, would impermissibly compromise
the independence of the judiciary and open the door to
possible abuse.25
We emphasized the weight of this case law in our arguments to
the district court, pointing out that the court never even gave the
public notice that it was considering sealing all of Moussaoui’s
pleadings, let alone an opportunity to be heard.  The government
contended that Moussaoui’s pro se filings were not documents filed
“in connection with” the underlying criminal case because the
pleadings had no rational relationship to the case and because the
24. Id. On remand in Steele, the district court unsealed various of the exhibits at
issue, ordering that only certain portions of individual exhibits be redacted for speci-
fied reasons. See Doc. No. 177 in United States v. Steele, 99-CR-9 (E.D. Va. May 11,
1999) (Order); see also, e.g., In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 500-02
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (approving trial court’s decision to proceed “by redacting documents”
for release to public in case involving proceedings ancillary to grand jury investigation
that were required, in part, to remain under seal).
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purpose of the pleadings was to convey messages to the outside
world.26  Within a month, the district court modified its August
29th order.  On September 27, 2002, the court held that all of de-
fendant’s pro se pleadings would initially be filed under seal.  The
United States would then have ten days to advise the court in writ-
ing if the pleading should remain sealed or redacted.  If the United
States did not so advise the court, the pleading at issue would be
unsealed without redaction.27
Unfortunately, the district court order was not self-executing.
Within a few months, some of our clients began to complain that
many of Moussaoui’s pro se pleadings that were supposed to be un-
sealed in the district court remained sealed.  There were also nu-
merous other pleadings that remained sealed with no indication of
the nature of those pleadings and no public notice of their sealing.
Consequently, our clients filed a second motion in the district court
seeking access to the pro se pleadings.
The government responded almost immediately to the motion
by conceding that many of Moussaoui’s pro se pleadings should be
unsealed.  Shortly thereafter, the government also conceded that
additional pleadings in the district court could be released either in
their entirety or in redacted form.  At about the same time, the dis-
trict court expressed its own frustration regarding “the extent to
which the United States’ intelligence officials have classified the
pleadings, orders and memorandum opinions in this case.”28  In-
deed, it did seem that virtually everything filed in the Moussaoui
case was sealed in a kind of knee-jerk concern for national security.
The fact that, with a little legal prodding, the government could
unseal documents that had been sealed when filed, raised questions
as to why they had been sealed in the first place.
The government’s concessions in the district court regarding
Moussaoui’s pro se filings, however, would soon become a footnote
26. In the alternative, the government argued that Moussaoui’s pro se pleadings
that contained irrelevant, scandalous, or immaterial matter should be returned to him
unfiled by the clerk of the court.  Doc. No. 464 at 1 & 2 in United States v. Moussaoui,
01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002) (August 22, 2002 letter from R. Spencer to Hon. L.
Brinkema).
27. United States v. Moussaoui, 31 Media L. Rep. 1574 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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in a larger battle to keep his more substantive motions out of the
public record.
II. THE BATTLE FOR ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS AND ORAL ARUGMENT
IN THE APPEAL OF MOUSSAOUI’S MOTION TO DEPOSE
RAMZI BIN AL-SHIBH
A. Background
In September 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured in Paki-
stan, an arrest heralded as a triumph in the government’s war on
terrorism.29  Though still at large when Moussaoui was indicted,
Mr. bin al-Shibh was named as a “supporting conspirator.”30  Specif-
ically, Mr. bin al-Shibh is alleged to have been a member of a terror-
ist cell in Germany and to have wired $14,000 to Moussaoui.31  Mr.
bin al-Shibh’s arrest plainly had implications for the Moussaoui
prosecution.32  In the months following Mr. bin al-Shibh’s capture,
Moussaoui made several attempts to gain access to him.33  Mous-
29. See Remarks by President George W. Bush at Doug Forrester for Senate Event,
Sept. 23, 2002, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020923-3.
html.  (“He was going to be the 20th hijacker, bin al-Shibh.  He wanted to come here to
kill. . . . You can’t hide from our justice.  We finally got him.”).
30. Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 14 in Moussaoui, 01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002).
31. Id. Count 1, Overt Acts ¶¶ 15, 67. See also Statement of FBI Director Robert S.
Mueller III at Justice Department News Conference Announcing Moussaoui Indict-
ment, Dec. 11, 2001, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks12_
11.htm (“Moussaoui was linked to Ramzi bin al-Shibh . . . who tried unsuccessfully to
get into the United States on four separate occasions. . . .[A]t the time of bin al-Shibh’s
last failed attempt to enter the United States, Moussaoui was contacting flight schools
and making arrangements to have a legitimate presence in the United States.”).
32. See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Tom Jackman, Latest Capture Adds a New Wrinkle in Mous-
saoui Case; Both Sides in Va. Trial Want to Talk to 9/11 Suspect Binalshibh, but U.S. May
Prefer to Limit Exposure, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2002, at A15 (quoting defense counsel as
stating that “[h]e’s obviously a central witness” and that the defense “should have an
opportunity to meet with the man [bin al-Shibh] and pitch to him why he should talk”);
Philip Shenon, Court Papers Show Moussaoui Seeks Access to Captured Al Qaeda Members,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at A20 (“Federal law enforcement officials say the capture of
Mr. bin al-Shibh has created a dilemma for prosecutors, since the Defense Department
and Central Intelligence Agency have refused to make him and other Qaeda figures
available for defense interviews”).
33. See Doc. No. 613 in United States v. Moussaoui, 01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(Defendant’s Motion for “Admission” Tape of Brother Bin al-Shibh, October 16, 2002)
(“The U.S. government has organize [sic] a complete black out on information about
Binalshibh because they know that they must stop him speaking out about my non-
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saoui’s court-appointed “standby” counsel also filed a motion seek-
ing pretrial access to Mr. bin al-Shibh and a writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum.34  On January 31, 2003, the district court granted
Moussaoui’s motion for access to Mr. bin al-Shibh.35  The papers in
support and in opposition to the motion and the court’s order,
however, remained sealed.  In addition, the district court’s docket
was virtually silent about the issue, and did not even mention Mr.
bin al-Shibh by name.  Consequently, most of what we knew about
Moussaoui’s efforts to depose bin al-Shibh, we learned from our
clients and the vigorous efforts of their reporters.  In March 2003,
the United States appealed the district court order granting Mous-
saoui access to bin al-Shibh.36  The government filed its initial brief
under seal, and by orders dated March 21, 2003 and March 24,
2003 the Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to seal
the substantive record in the appeal, to close oral argument to the
public, and to seal the government’s certificate of confidentiality
and motion to seal oral argument.37
In sum, all of the documents concerning Mr. bin al-Shibh, in
both the district court and the Fourth Circuit, were sealed and oral
argument was to be closed to the public.  Thus, we did not know
any of the government’s substantive arguments on either the ap-
peal or in support of its motion to seal.  We did not know, for exam-
ple, the jurisdictional basis for the appeal.  In federal court, most
orders are not appealable until final.38  Was the United States
claiming that the district court’s order was a collateral order appeal-
able under the collateral order doctrine?39  Was it claiming some
saoui, 01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002) (Defendant’s Motion to Bring Brother Ramzi Bin al-
Shibh to the Open Court of Moussaoui, September 19, 2002) (“Ramzi is my prime
witness at trial.”).
34. United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 513 (4th Cir. 2003).
35. Id. See also Doc. No. 732 in Moussaoui, 01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002).
36. We subsequently learned that the district court had ordered that the govern-
ment produce Ramzi bin al-Shibh for a pre-trial deposition pursuant to Rule 15 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal procedure. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d at 513.
37. Doc. No. 3754127-1 at 1 in Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (March 21, 2003) (Order);
Doc. No. 3755646-1 at 1 in Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (March 24, 2003) (Order).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2003) (providing that the courts of appeals “shall have juris-
diction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States”).
39. Under the “collateral order” doctrine, a non-final ruling of the district court
may, nevertheless, be immediately appealed if it “conclusively determine[s] the dis-
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other special basis for jurisdiction?  We knew only that the govern-
ment had appealed a district court order granting Moussaoui access
to an alleged co-conspirator, widely believed to be Ramzi bin al-
Shibh.
We had one tantalizing clue to the argument advanced by the
government to seal all briefs and the oral argument on appeal.  In
its March 21 order, the Fourth Circuit granted the government’s
certificate of confidentiality and sealed the joint appendix and oral
argument.  The sole basis for the order cited in the public record
was the Fourth Circuit’s notation that “the argument is sealed pur-
suant to the provisions of the Classified Information Procedures
Act.”40  In its March 24 order sealing the government’s motion to
seal its certificate of confidentiality – i.e. sealing its motion to seal –
the Fourth Circuit was silent.
We got our second clue when I called the Assistant United
States Attorney to get his consent to our motion to intervene in the
Fourth Circuit for the purposes of making our access motion.41  As
it turns out, one of the lead prosecutors – Robert Spencer – was my
college roommate.  Spencer told me, however, that the government
would not consent to our motion to intervene because this was a
“CIPA matter” and, according to Spencer, our motion was com-
pletely meritless.42
B. CIPA
The Classified Information Procedures Act was enacted in
1980 to combat “graymail, a practice whereby a criminal defendant
threatens to reveal classified information during the course of his
trial in the hope of forcing the government to drop the criminal
charge against him.”43  CIPA provides a mechanism for trial courts
the action, and [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”  Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
40. Doc. No. 3754127-1 at 1 in United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (March
21, 2003).
41. Fourth Circuit Local Rule 27(a) requires a party seeking leave to intervene to
confer with counsel for the parties.
42. Spencer subsequently relented, and consented to our motion to intervene,
although he did not consent to our access motion.
43. United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985) (footnote omit-
ted); see also S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4296-97 (not-
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to rule on the admissibility of classified information in advance of
trial.44  Typically, cases arise under CIPA in two situations.  First,
when the government does not want to reveal classified information
in documents to be made available to the defendant in discovery, it
may move the court under Section 4 of CIPA to delete the classified
material or to substitute either a statement admitting relevant facts
that the classified information would tend to prove or a summary of
the information.45  The request is made ex parte and in camera.46
The second way CIPA can be invoked is under Sections 5 and 6 of
the statute.  Under Section 5, the defendant is obliged to inform
the court if he “reasonably expects to disclose or cause the disclo-
sure of classified information in any manner in connection with any
trial or pretrial proceeding involving [his] criminal prosecution.”47
Based on this notification, the government may move for a hearing
under Section 6(a) to make “any determinations concerning the
use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information that would
otherwise be made during the trial or pretrial proceeding.”48  Once
the court has made such a ruling, the government may take an in-
terlocutory appeal of that ruling.49  Unlike a Section 4 determina-
tion, a Section 6 hearing is not ex parte – the government must
provide the defendant with notice of the classified information that
is at issue.50
We were puzzled by the government’s insistence that the entire
appeal was governed by CIPA.  Although we were unable to review
most of the pleadings in the district court, there did not appear to
have been a CIPA proceeding which formed the basis for the gov-
questionable conduct by defendants since wholly proper defense attempts to obtain or
disclose classified information may present the government with the same ‘disclose or
dismiss’ dilemma”).
44. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 393; see also, e.g., S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 1
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4294 (CIPA’s purpose is to provide “pre-
trial procedures that will permit the trial judge to rule on questions of admissibility
involving classified information before introduction of the evidence in open court”).
45. 18 U.S.C. App. 3 § 4 (2003).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 5(a).
48. Id. § 6(a).
49. Id. § 7(a).
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ernment’s appeal as required by the statute.51  Of course, we could
have been wrong, especially given the paucity of information on the
district court’s public docket, but it appeared that the district
court’s January 31 order arose from Moussaoui’s own pro se motions
as well as related motions filed by his stand-by counsel, not from any
CIPA proceeding initiated by the government.
In addition, Moussaoui did not have access to classified infor-
mation that he might threaten to disclose at trial.  Unlike the typi-
cal defendant in a CIPA matter, such as former Admiral John D.
Poindexter,52 Moussaoui was not a former CIA or NSA official with
access to classified information.  Indeed, Moussaoui’s stand-by at-
torneys have argued that Moussaoui’s due process rights have been
violated because he is unable to review classified information with
his attorneys and thus is unable to adequately prepare his de-
fense.53  Moreover, any information that Moussaoui might elicit
from bin al-Shibh would not be classified.  Rather, information be-
comes classified only when the appropriate classifying authority
designates it as such.54
Finally, CIPA could not have provided the statutory basis for
sealing all documents and denying access to the courtroom in the
Fourth Circuit.  Pursuant to section 9 of CIPA, the Chief Justice of
the United States may “prescribe rules establishing procedures for
the protection against unauthorized disclosure of any classified in-
formation in the custody of the United States district courts, courts
of appeals, or Supreme Court.”55  These procedures contemplate
51. See 18 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6(a) (providing for learning to determine use at trial of
classified information).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1990) (denying,
on national security grounds, motion of media intervenors for access to deposition of
former President Ronald Reagan in trial of former National Security advisor where dep-
osition would include classified information because former President Reagan, “by defi-
nition and practice, is the repository of the nation’s most vital secrets.”).
53. See, e.g., Doc. No. 166 at 8-11 in Moussaoui, 01-CR-455 (E.D. Va. 2002). (Memo-
randum by Zacarias Moussaoui in support of Motion for Access by Defendant to Classi-
fied and Sensitive Discovery and Relief from Special Administrative Measures
Concerning Confinement).
54. See Exec. Order No. 12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (April 17, 1995) (classified
information is only that which is owned or controlled by the United States and has been
designated as such).
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that certain appellate hearings may in held in camera.56  The proce-
dures, however, expressly define the limited portion of the appel-
late record that falls within their ambit:  “any description of, or
reference to, classified information contained in papers filed in an
appeal, pursuant to Section 7 of the Act.”57  The procedures thus
expressly distinguish between classified information contained in
appellate papers and the papers themselves.
The media never contended at any point in the Moussaoui pro-
ceedings that they were entitled to view properly classified materi-
als.  But it seemed apparent there were many sealed documents in
both the district court and the Fourth Circuit containing informa-
tion that was not classified, or that could easily be redacted.  It was
difficult to imagine, for example, why the legal arguments in favor of
prohibiting public access both to the record and to the courtroom
should be secret.  Indeed, it had already been reported that “fed-
eral prosecutors [were] citing a World War II-era Supreme Court
decision as part of their effort to overturn a judge’s ruling that
Moussaoui’s lawyers [could] interview Ramzi Binalshibh.”58  The le-
gal basis for the government’s appeal did not seem a matter of na-
tional security.
Finally, even if CIPA did govern the issues on appeal, CIPA
plainly did not mandate complete secrecy of all papers and pro-
ceedings.  As a preliminary matter, the Fourth Circuit had held that
the mere invocation of national security did not automatically ne-
gate the First Amendment and common law rights to media access
nor did it authorize courts to ignore the procedural requirements
designed to protect those rights.  In In re Washington Post Co., the
district court sealed certain documents pursuant to CIPA, including
affidavits proffered by the government to establish the national se-
56. See Security Procedures Established Pursuant to Pub. L. 96-456, 94 Stat 2025, by the
Chief Justice of the United States for the Protection of Classified Information § 3 (“[a]ny in cam-
era proceeding — including a[n] . . . appellate hearing — concerning the use, rele-
vance, or admissibility of classified information, shall be held in secure quarters”),
reprinted following 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 9 (2003).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 7(a)(5) (emphasis added).
58. Jerry Markon, U.S. Tries to Block Access to Witness for Terror Trial, WASH. POST,
April 2, 2003, at A7 (“According to people familiar with them, the government briefs
use mostly national security arguments, saying that those issues outweigh the impor-
tance Binalshibh might have to Moussaoui’s defense.  One case prosecutors cite is John-
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curity interests at stake in the underlying criminal prosecution, and
closed the proceedings in connection with them.59  On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit considered “whether the procedural requirements
and the substantive standards applied in evaluating the scope of
[the public’s First Amendment right of access] should differ when
considerations of national security are at stake.”60  The court
squarely answered that question in the negative:
In [cases implicating national security interests], the gov-
ernment contends, the district court should have discre-
tion to adapt its procedures to the specific circumstances,
and may properly defer to the judgment of the executive
branch.  We disagree.  While we recognize, and share, the
government’s concern that dangerous consequences may
result from the inappropriate disclosure of classified in-
formation, we do not believe that adherence to the proce-
dures outlined in Knight Publishing would create an
unacceptable risk of such disclosure.61
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the procedural compo-
nents of the public’s access rights “are fully applicable in the con-
text of closure motions based on threats to national security,”
including motions based on CIPA.62
59. 807 F.2d at 386.
60. Id.
61. 807 F.2d at 391.  Under the rules set forth in Knight Publishing, the district
court must:  (1) give the public adequate notice that the sealing of documents may be
ordered; (2) provide interested persons “an opportunity to object to the request before
the court ma[kes] its decision; (3) if the district court decides to close a hearing or seal
documents, “it must state its reasons on the record, supported by specific findings;” and
(4) the court must state its reasons for rejecting alternatives to closure.  In re Knight
Publ’g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1984).
62. 807 F.2d at 392.  As more than one appellate court has observed, the invoca-
tion by the government of national security or analogous interests does not justify blind
acquiescence in requests for wholesale sealing or closure.  In refusing to seal appellate
proceedings in a trade secret matter, for example, the Seventh Circuit noted:
Even disputes about claims of national security are litigated in the open.
Briefs in the Pentagon Papers case, and the hydrogen bomb plans case, were
available to the press, although sealed appendices discussed in detail the
documents for which protection was sought.
Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
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In addition, courts routinely resolve the interplay between
CIPA and the public’s right of access without resort to blanket seal-
ing and wholesale closure of proceedings, even when classified ma-
terial is involved.  In United States v. Pelton, for example, the district
court examined the legislative history of CIPA and concluded that
“[t]here is nothing in [it] to suggest that the government may close
all or part of a public trial.”63  Indeed, the district court in that case
expressly rejected the government’s assertion that CIPA provided
an exception to the “otherwise strong presumption in favor of
openness in all matters in a criminal trial.”64  Similarly, in United
States v. Poindexter, 65 while holding that the deposition of former
President Reagan would be held in camera “because top secret and
other extremely sensitive information will pervade the deposi-
tion,”66 the court based its ruling on traditional access jurispru-
dence – not CIPA – and noted that “CIPA obviously cannot
override a constitutional right of access.”67  Indeed, the court held
that a redacted transcript of the deposition would be made availa-
ble to the public as soon as sensitive material was edited out, and
noted that the issue was “not whether, but when, the press will have
access to President Reagan’s testimony.”68
Finally, in United States v. Ressam, the court again rejected the
government’s blanket contention that CIPA materials “remain be-
yond the scope of the public’s First Amendment right of access”
and that CIPA and its implementing regulations “greatly restrict the
judicial branch’s authority to disclose classified information.”69
63. 696 F. Supp. 156, 157 (D. Md. 1986).
64. Id. at 158.  Although the court in Pelton ultimately declined to allow contem-
poraneous, live access by the news media intervenors to the portion of the trial proceed-
ings in which the evidentiary material at issue containing classified information was
introduced in evidence, it ordered that a transcript of the tape recordings in question
be made public after properly classified material was redacted. Id. at 159.  And, the
district court noted that the tapes in question were estimated to have a combined
length of five minutes, meaning that the press and public would be excluded from the
proceedings only briefly:  “Were the government seeking to close significant periods of
the trial,” the district court cautioned, “the balance struck . . . might well be different.”
Id. at 159-60.
65. 732 F. Supp. 165.
66. Id. at 167.
67. Id. at 167 n.9.
68. Id. at 169.
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While the court recognized that the public had no “‘tradition of
access’ to documents that are submitted as part of an ex parte, in
camera hearing to determine whether certain information in the
Government’s possession is discoverable,”70 it nevertheless held
that CIPA “cannot negate the public’s First Amendment right of
access to criminal trials or closely related pretrial proceedings.”71
The Sixth Circuit recently explained the strong policy reasons
for open judicial proceedings when it denied a motion to close oral
arguments in a case in which the government asserted that disclo-
sure of information would compromise an ongoing criminal
investigation:
While we deliberate in private, we recognize the funda-
mental importance of “issuing public decisions after pub-
lic arguments based on public records.  The political
branches of government claim legitimacy by election,
judges by reason.  Any step that withdraws an element of
the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing
decision look more like fiat, which requires compelling
justification.”  To the extent the government believes that
it must reveal sensitive information to the court as part of
its argument, it can “submit arguments in writing under
seal in lieu of the in camera oral argument.”72
Despite all of the case law favoring open judicial proceedings,
there seemed little doubt  that in the typical CIPA case – i.e., one in
which the defendant has access to classified information and the
government seeks a court ruling on whether he may use it at trial –
the public’s right of access to the CIPA materials themselves is ex-
tremely limited.  As the Ressam court held, the public’s right of ac-
cess does not attach to material properly submitted to the court in
camera and ex parte pursuant to section 4 of CIPA.73  Thus, the cru-
cial issue for the media in both the district court and the Fourth
Circuit in Moussaoui was whether CIPA had been properly invoked,
70. Id. at 1258.
71. 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
72. Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 262 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see
also In re United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (appeal implicating national secur-
ity conducted through public briefs and judicial opinions, although parts of one opin-
ion were redacted to protect confidences).
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or whether the government was trying to shoehorn its arguments to
fit the CIPA mold in order to seek immediate review of the district
court’s order.
Beyond the substantive argument, it appeared obvious the
Fourth Circuit ignored its own precedent and the requirements of
the First Amendment and common law when it sealed all pleadings
on appeal and closed the courtroom for oral argument.74  No no-
tice had been given; no hearing was conducted; no reasons had
been articulated; and the court appeared not to have considered
any alternatives to complete closure.  At a minimum, we hoped to
convince the appellate court to articulate its reasons for closing the
courtroom and sealing all pleadings.
Three days after the media filed its opening brief in the Fourth
Circuit, the court released an unclassified, redacted version of the
government’s seventy-two page brief on the merits of its appeal.
The brief confirmed our suspicions about the true nature of the
proceedings in the district court.  There had been no CIPA hear-
ing.  Thus, CIPA could not provide the jurisdictional basis for the
government’s appeal of the order granting Moussaoui access to
Ramzi bin al-Shibh.  The government asserted that the Fourth Cir-
cuit had jurisdiction over its appeal “under section 7 of the Classi-
fied Information Procedures Act.”75  “Alternatively,” the brief
continued, “the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
the collateral order doctrine.”76  Obviously, if a CIPA hearing had
been conducted in the district court and the government were now
appealing from it, the government would not need an “alternative”
basis for jurisdiction; section 7 of CIPA would provide for immedi-
ate appellate review of the district court’s order.77  In addition, in
74. See, e.g., Knight Publ’g Co., 743 F.2d at 234-35 (Before sealing, the court must:
1) give public adequate notice that sealing may be ordered; 2) provide interested per-
sons “an opportunity to object to the request before the court ma[kes] its decision;” 3)
“state its reasons on the record [for sealing], supported by specific findings;” 4) state its
reasons for rejecting alternatives to closure.); see discussion supra note 61 and accompa-
nying text.
75. Brief for Appellant at 4, United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir.
2003) (No. 03-4162).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Section 7 of CIPA provides for an interlocutory appeal “from a decision or
order of a district court in a criminal case authorizing the disclosure of classified infor-





      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 99 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR402.txt unknown Seq: 19 16-APR-04 9:58
2003] EYES TIED SHUT 191
the short portion of its brief devoted to whether the district court
erred in ordering the deposition of Mr. bin al-Shibh without consid-
ering alternatives to his testimony as required by CIPA, the govern-
ment did not assert that CIPA governed or provided the basis for
appeal.  Rather, the government contended only that “CIPA pro-
vides the appropriate framework for analysis.”78  Thus, the government’s
brief implicitly conceded that CIPA did not govern the access issues
on appeal.
Nevertheless, in its response to the media’s access motion, the
government essentially argued that its appeal and all related plead-
ings were “CIPA proceedings.”  Though that phrase was not de-
fined anywhere in the statute, the government obviously sought to
invoke the statute both to justify its immediate appeal of the district
court’s order and to argue that there was no tradition of access to
hearings conducted pursuant to CIPA.  In response, the media ar-
gued that there was no basis in CIPA or in the case law for reversing
the presumption in favor of public access to oral argument and the
record on appeal.79  Indeed, the fact that the government’s brief on
the merits had now been released, albeit in redacted form, under-
mined the government’s argument that everything associated with
the issues on appeal were somehow cloaked with talismanic immu-
nity under CIPA.  Further, with access to the partially redacted
brief, it seemed clear that the appeal was not properly characterized
as arising under CIPA in the first instance.  We now knew the proce-
dural posture in which the case came to the Fourth Circuit:  by writ
protective order sought by the United States to prevent the disclosure of classified infor-
mation.”  18 U.S.C. § 7.
78. Brief for Appellant at 65, United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (emphasis
added).  In a footnote, the government quoted the district court as having found that
“this case does [not] ‘literally implicate’ CIPA”. Id. at 65 n.8.  Given that the district
court’s order was sealed, this was our first indication of the basis for the district court’s
decision.
79. The media also argued, relying on In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, that
the Fourth Circuit was required to examine the government’s arguments in favor of
closure, and to adhere to the procedural components of the public’s access rights; i.e,
notice, a hearing, the articulation of its reasons should it order closure, as well as the
consideration of alternatives to closure. See discussion text accompanying note 82.  In
addition, relying on Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002), the media con-
tended that CIPA does not divest a court of the power to review the Executive’s classifi-
cation decisions, at least where those decisions collide with the public’s constitutional
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of habeas corpus.80  As far as the government’s brief on the merits,
and the public record revealed, no proceeding under sections 4, 5
or 6 of CIPA took place with respect to defendant’s motion for ac-
cess to Mr. bin al-Shibh.  Thus, as we argued in our reply papers, in
the absence of such a proceeding, the government could not in-
voke section 7 of CIPA as the basis for its appeal.  Its entire argu-
ment, built on the premise that the public had no tradition of
access to CIPA proceedings, collapsed when that premise failed.
C. The Access Motion
On May 13, 2003, the Fourth Circuit granted, in large part, the
media’s access motion.  The court wrote:
The value of openness in judicial proceedings can hardly
be overestimated.  “The political branches of government
claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason.  Any step
that withdraws an element of the judicial process from
public view makes the ensuing decision look more like
fiat, which requires compelling justification.”81
The Fourth Circuit rejected the government’s sweeping con-
tention that CIPA justified sealing of the oral argument and docu-
ments on appeal.82  “We disagree with the Government’s
contention that because this appeal is related to CIPA, all of the
materials and the oral argument must be held under seal.  As [the
media] Intervenors note, CIPA alone cannot justify the sealing of
oral argument and pleadings.”83  In a footnote, the Fourth Circuit
noted “that throughout its opposition to Intervenors’ motion, the
Government has phrased its arguments as though every document
filed with this court contains classified information.  This is not cor-
rect, and we decline the Government’s implicit invitation to gloss
80. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d at 513.
81. United States v. Moussaoui, 65 Fed. Appx. 881, 885 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000)).
82. Id. On May 16, the district court similarly rejected the government’s argu-
ment that CIPA justified maintaining completely under seal the filings to which the
media sought access, and ordered the government to immediate advise the court
whether certain pleadings could be unsealed.  Doc. No. 929 at 2 in Moussaoui, 01-CR-
455 (E.D. Va. 2002) (May 16, 2003 Order).  Shortly thereafter, many of these pleadings
were released either in their entirety, or in redacted form.
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over the significant differences in the kinds of materials that have
been presented to us.”84  Even in the absence of CIPA, the court
held, “the mere assertion of national security concerns by the Gov-
ernment is not sufficient reason to close a hearing or deny access to
documents.”85  The court correctly found that it “must indepen-
dently determine whether, and to what extent, the proceedings and
documents must be kept under seal.”86
Examining each pleading in turn, the Fourth Circuit held that:
1) Moussaoui’s pro se pleadings would remain sealed initially, but
then be released following the procedure established in the district
court; 2) the government’s briefs on appeal would be released in
redacted form, and “we will carefully compare the redacted version
of each brief to the unredacted version to ensure that the redac-
tions of unclassified material are no greater than necessary;” 3) the
government must identify those materials in its appendices that are
classified and unclassified, and as to the latter, present its argu-
ments as to why they should remain sealed.87  In that regard, the
court held that “[t]his argument shall account for the fact that seal-
ing an entire document is inappropriate when selective redaction
will adequately protect the interests involved.”88
The Fourth Circuit also ordered the unsealing of the sealed
certificate of confidentiality, the motion to seal oral argument, and
the motion to seal the certificate of confidentiality.89  The govern-
ment sought to seal these documents, the Fourth Circuit noted, be-
cause placing them in the public file would “reveal the substance of
the district court order presently being appealed.”90  The govern-
ment’s argument was remarkable because it presumed that even
disclosing the contents of the district court order – let alone the
reasons for it – would somehow compromise national security.  If
this argument had prevailed, it would have made it impossible for
the public to challenge the sealing or closure of any judicial pro-
84. Id. at 887 n.4.
85. Id. at 887 (citing In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 391-92).
86. Id. The Fourth Circuit declined, however, “to review, and perhaps reject, clas-
sification decisions made by the executive branch.” Id. at n.5.
87. Id. at 888.
88. 65 Fed. App. at 888.
89. Id. at 889-90.
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ceedings that the government, in its sole discretion, determined
should be closed.  Of course that was exactly what the government
intended in the Moussaoui case, a position that the Fourth Circuit
squarely rejected.  Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected the govern-
ment’s contention that even if the appeal were authorized by sec-
tion 7 of CIPA, that section mandated that the oral argument be
held in a closed courtroom.91  Noting that oral arguments in appel-
late proceedings have historically been open to the public, the
Fourth Circuit ordered that the oral argument on the merits of the
government’s appeal be bifurcated, with arguments on issues in-
volving the discussion of classified information taking place in
closed session.92  The court further ordered that a redacted tran-
script of the sealed hearing be made available as soon as practicable
after oral argument.93
The Fourth Circuit’s rejection of the government’s sweeping
attempt under CIPA to seal the papers and courtroom in its appeal
of the district court’s order did not bode well for the merits of the
government’s appeal.  The Fourth Circuit exhibited little sympathy
with the government’s attempt to use CIPA to impose total secrecy.
A little more than a month later, on June 23, 2003, the appeal was
dismissed.94
D. The Appeal of the District Court Order
Rather than addressing the substantive issues in the govern-
ment’s appeal of the district court order permitting Moussaoui to
depose Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction
“because the order of the district court is not yet an appealable
one.”95  The Fourth Circuit rejected all three bases the government
91. Id. Anticipating its ultimate ruling on the merits, the Fourth Circuit also
noted that “it is not at all clear that this appeal arises from CIPA.” Id.
92. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that three issues would be discussed during the
public portion of the oral argument:  “Whether this court has jurisdiction over the ap-
peal; Whether separation of powers concerns mandate reversal of the district court’s
order; Whether compulsory process reaches an enemy combatant overseas.” Id.
93. 65 Fed. App. at 890.
94. Chief Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion for the panel, in which Judges Williams
and Gregory joined.  333 F.3d at 511.  The court’s order on the access motion was
unsigned, but was entered at the direction of Chief Judge Wilkins with the concur-
rences of Judges Widener and Niemeyer. See 65 Fed. Appx. at 891.
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put forward for appellate jurisdiction: CIPA, the collateral order
doctrine, and mandamus.  “Ultimately,” the court stated, “the order
of the district court is a discovery order like any other, and must be
treated the same for jurisdictional purposes,” regardless of the “sub-
stantial national security concerns” raised by the case.96  Most signif-
icantly, the Fourth Circuit rejected the government’s contention
that the order of the district court directing the deposition of
Ramzi bin al-Shibh was, pursuant to section 6 of CIPA, “‘a decision
or order . . . authorizing the disclosure of classified information,’
from which it may take an immediate appeal.”97
CIPA § 6, to which the Government points, is concerned
with the disclosure of classified information to the defen-
dant or his attorneys. [citation omitted].  It is true, of
course, that the district court issued the testimonial writ
based in part on its assessment that the enemy combatant
witness’ testimony would likely be helpful to Moussaoui’s
defense.  But, neither this conclusion, nor the fact that
the purpose of the deposition is to preserve the enemy
combatant witness’ testimony for potential use at trial, is
sufficient to establish the applicability of CIPA.  At its
core, the order of the district court concerned only the
question of whether Moussaoui and standby counsel
would be granted access to the enemy combatant witness
(and if so, what form of access), not whether any particu-
lar statement of this witness would be admitted at trial.
The district court was thus correct to conclude that CIPA
applies here by analogy.  Because CIPA is not directly ap-
plicable, § 7 does not authorize an interlocutory appeal.
[citation omitted].98
Thus, the Fourth Circuit decided it was without jurisdiction to hear
the appeal until the government suffered some actual harm, such
as dismissal of the indictment or some other sanction if it refused to
make Ramzi bin al-Shibh available for a deposition.99
96. Id. at 516.
97. Id. at 514 (alteration in original).
98. Id. at 514-15.
99. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d at 515 (“The order of the district court will not become
final unless and until the Government refuses to comply and the district court imposes
a sanction.”).  At the time of this writing, the government has taken the position that it
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The government then filed a motion for rehearing en banc,
which was denied on July 14, 2003.  Seven judges voted to deny
rehearing, while five judges dissented.  Chief Judge Wilkins, the au-
thor of the panel decision, wrote an opinion concurring in the de-
nial of a rehearing en banc which Judge Niemeyer joined. Judge
Widener wrote a dissenting opinion, as did Judge Luttig.  Judge Wil-
kinson also wrote a dissenting opinion in which Judge Niemeyer
joined.
Although the conflicting opinions purported to address a sim-
ple matter of appellate jurisdiction, at issue were contrasting views
of the deference owed to the Executive Branch in matters of na-
tional security.  As Judge Luttig wrote:
I believe my colleagues have gravely underestimated the
effect that their respective orders and decisions have al-
ready had, and now will continue to have, on the Nation’s
intelligence gathering during this critical period of our
history, as we wage war against terrorism and its sponsors
around the globe.100
In response, Chief Judge Wilkins wrote:
Siding with the Government in all cases where national
security concerns are assailed would entail surrender of
the judicial branch and abandonment of our sworn com-
mitment to uphold the rule of law.
There is a better way, which is indeed the only correct
way.  We can, as we have done here, apply settled princi-
ples governing the appealability of discovery orders in a
consistent manner.  This will allow the executive branch
to anticipate the likely resolution of legal issues, which
will in turn ensure that the executive branch retains the
burden and the authority to decide how best to protect
national security.  Because the panel has followed this
Shibh.  The court has sanctioned the government by foreclosing it from offering any
evidence at trial that Moussaoui had any involvement in or knowledge of the attacks of
September 11, 2001, and from seeking the death penalty.  United States v. Moussaoui,
282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003).  The government has appealed this sanction.
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path, a majority of the members of this court has correctly
decided to deny rehearing en banc.101
Essentially, the conflict between the judges resulted from dif-
fering interpretations of the scope of CIPA.102  Chief Judge Wilkins,
noting that section 7 of CIPA “creates an exception to the general
prohibition on interlocutory appeals and therefore must be nar-
rowly construed,” stated that section 7 authorizes interlocutory ap-
peals “only of orders entered pursuant to the provisions of CIPA, of
which § 7 is part.”103  Thus, he would find a right to appeal only
when the lower court order arose under some other section of
CIPA – most relevantly, section 6,104 which governs the use of classi-
fied information at trial or in pre-trial proceedings.105  But, as he
noted, “no issue regarding the admission of the deposition testi-
mony at trial is yet presented, because it is not known what the wit-
ness might say during the deposition, if he agrees to speak at all.”106
In other words, until there was an actual ruling under CIPA regard-
ing what use could be made of testimony at trial, an appellate court
should not step into the void and offer what, in effect, would be an
advisory opinion.
Both Judges Wilkinson and Luttig took issue with this narrow
reading of the applicability of section 7 of CIPA.107  They argued
that the language of section 7(a) itself was quite broad, providing
that appellate jurisdiction will lie over “a decision or order of a dis-
trict court in a criminal case authorizing disclosure of classified in-
formation.”108  As Judge Wilkinson noted, the statute itself was
silent as to whether only orders entered pursuant to section 6 (or
101. Id. at 282 (Wilkins, C.J.).
102. Judge Luttig also differed with the majority over whether the district court’s
ruling was appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  This aspect of the Fourth’s
Circuit’s decision is beyond the scope of this article, and will not be discussed here.
103. 336 F.3d at 280.
104. As the district court held, section 6 of CIPA was applicable only by analogy.
Moussaoui, 333 F.3d at 515.
105. 336 F.3d at 280-81.
106. Id. at 281.
107. Judge Widener also appeared to take issue with this ruling, but his short dis-
sent contends only that the testimony of Ramzi bin Al-Shibh will undoubtedly reveal an
enormity of classified information and, therefore, “Section 7 of the Classified Informa-
tion Procedure Act provides that the orders of the district court in question be subject
to appeal.” Id. at 282 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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some other section) of CIPA were appealable under section 7.109
Judge Luttig stated, “had Congress wished to circumscribe section
7(a) so as to provide appellate jurisdiction only over such orders, it
could easily have done so.”110  Both dissenting judges were of the
opinion that the broad language of section 7 authorized an imme-
diate appeal of any district court order that had the effect of disclos-
ing classified information.
Both dissenting judges also took issue with the panel’s decision
that “granting access” to the source of the classified information –
i.e., Ramzi bin al-Shibh – was not the same as “disclosing” classified
information.111  Both judges assumed that the witness possessed in-
formation that will be or has been designated classified, even before
he actually testified.  Both judges also assumed that the “disclosure”
of this information to Moussaoui, at a deposition, was the type of
disclosure with which CIPA is concerned.112
In the panel decision, Judge Wilkins acknowledged that sec-
tion 7 “authorizes the government to take an interlocutory appeal
from an order of the district court that authorizes the disclosure of
classified information to the defendant.”113  Judge Wilkins also ac-
knowledged that “there is no question that most or all of what the
enemy combatant witness says during a deposition will be deemed
classified by the government . . . .”114  Nevertheless, under the
panel’s narrow reading of the scope of section 7, because the wit-
ness had not yet testified and the district court had not issued any
order “governed by one of the provisions of CIPA,” the order was
109. 336 F.3d at 284 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see also 336 F.2d at 288 (Luttig, J.,
dissenting) (“Section 7(a)’s authorization of immediate appeal is not limited to orders
that, by their terms, are entered pursuant to CIPA or even to orders that are authorized
by CIPA”).
110. Id. (Luttig, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 284 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); 287 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
112. See e.g., id. at 289 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Clegg, 740
F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1984) for the proposition that “‘CIPA is as concerned with controlling
disclosures to the defendant as it is with controlling disclosures to the public’”).
113. Id. at 280 (Wilkins, C.J.).
114. 336 F.3d at 280.  A narrow reading of CIPA, however, would not require a
court to guess at what might or might not be designated classified.  On this basis alone,
an appellate court could decline to exercise jurisdiction under section 7 of CIPA.  As
Judge Wilkins noted “no issue regarding the admission of the deposition testimony at
trial is yet presented, because it is not yet known what the witness might say during the
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not appealable.115  Further, because CIPA creates an exception to
the rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals, it would be more reason-
able to narrowly construe it to permit interlocutory appeals only
when authorized by some other section of CIPA.116  Thus, as be-
tween finding sweeping authority under any provision of CIPA for
an interlocutory appeal or finding it only as specifically provided
for under CIPA, the majority wisely chose the more narrow course.
In effect, the dissenting judges would read CIPA as broadly as
the government attempted to, both in its appeal on the merits and
in its opposition to the media’s access motion.  Without making the
fine distinctions that the statute requires, both the government and
the dissenters would wield CIPA as a blunderbuss, giving the Execu-
tive Branch the power not only to designate testimony as confiden-
tial before it is even given, but to then decide how and whether the
public should have access to the information.  Judge Widener con-
tended that the panel decision “pushes the government to make
[a] draconian choice . . . about whether to divulge confidential in-
formation or instead to risk sanctions by refusing disclosure.”117
Judges Widener and Luttig, however, would permit the government
to seek an advisory ruling on any decision involving classified infor-
mation by a trial court that the government did not like while the
accused, presumably, sits in prison waiting for his trial to com-
mence.  Given the real harm to the accused, and the limited scope
of interlocutory review in most circumstances, requiring the govern-
ment to show actual harm in order to seek an immediate appeal
seems a reasonable requirement.
The dissenters’ argument that section 7 of CIPA authorizes an
immediate interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order ignores
the specific purpose of the statute, which is to provide the govern-
ment with a practical mechanism to deal with the problem of
“graymail” by permitting trial courts to make evidentiary rulings
concerning the admissibility of classified information in advance of
actual trial.118  If, and when, the trial court rules against the govern-
115. Id. at 280.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 285.
118. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 393; see also, S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 1
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4294 (CIPA’s purpose is to provide “pre-
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ment on the use of the classified information, that order is appeala-
ble under section 7.119  To transform this very specific – and limited
– provision of CIPA into a sword rather than a shield, which both
the government and the dissenters would do, is to create a far more
sweeping provision than was intended by Congress.  Indeed, the
teaching of the Pelton120 and Ressam121 cases, and to a certain extent
the Poindexter122 case, is that CIPA does not apply to the threatened
disclosure of all classified information, but only to that information
specifically put at issue by the statute.  These cases, and the panel
decision in the Moussaoui case, re-affirm that CIPA is a narrow stat-
ute drafted to deal with a very specific procedural problem.  It was
not intended to give the government extra-judicial powers in its
prosecution of terrorism cases after September 11.
CONCLUSION
Fortunately, by a narrow vote, the Fourth Circuit resisted the
temptation to turn CIPA into a new procedural weapon in the gov-
ernment’s “war on terror.”  Nevertheless, as the Moussaoui case and
other terrorism cases are prosecuted, there is a continuing danger
that well-meaning but misguided judges will transform a limited
procedural device into a sweeping authorization for secrecy that
will injure the rights of both criminal defendants and the public.
involving classified information before introduction of the evidence in open court”).
See discussion supra note 44 and accompanying text.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 7(a).
120. 696 F. Supp. 156.
121. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1252.
122. 732 F. Supp. 165.
